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ABSTRACT: In October 2015, a student protest at the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS), a historically 
white university (HWU), arising in opposition to the decision taken by the University Council to increase 
tuition fees, spurred a massive wave of mobilizations across the country. The protests drew national and 
international media attention to what became the #FeesMustFall movement, named after the most popu-
lar twitter hashtag adopted by the protesters. Why did a local mobilization at WITS in 2015 trigger a na-
tional wave of student protests? After ten days of protests, the South African President intervened directly 
to calm down the situation by announcing a 0% increase in tuition fees for 2016. To all appearances, ten 
days of protests allowed South African students to win their battle over the hike in tuition fees. How and 
why did they obtain this concession? To answer the questions above, I have combined various qualitative 
methods of analysis. I carried out several in-depth interviews with relevant actors involved in the issue; I 
analysed movement documents elaborated by the students in the year of the protest (2015) as well as the 
main policy documents on higher education in post-apartheid South Africa (1994-2016) released by the 
government. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Student protests have been a relatively frequent phenomenon in post-apartheid 
South Africa (Cele et al. 2016). In particular, student unrest over financial exclusion (i.e. 
tuition and registration fees, accommodation, transport, and food issues) has been a 
recurrent experience within the campuses of the ‘historically black universities’ (HBU) 
since 1994. Most of the black students that come from a working-class background and 
have accessed the higher education (HE) system over the past twenty years have been 
unable to afford the full cost of a university education (Hodes 2016)1.  Yet in 2015 a 
student protest at the University of the Witwatersrand (WITS), a historically white uni-
versity (HWU), arising in opposition to the decision taken by the University Council to 
increase tuition fees, spurred a massive wave of mobilizations across the country. The 
protests drew national and international media attention to what became the #Fees-
MustFall (#FMF) movement, named after the most popular twitter hashtag adopted by 
the protesters (Booysen 2016). Why did a local mobilization at WITS in 2015 trigger a 
national wave of student protests?  
Furthermore, after ten days of massive and disruptive protests, which also brought 
about the full shutdown of most of the universities in the country, the South African 
President, Jacob Zuma, directly intervened to calm down the situation by announcing a 
0% increase in tuition fees for 2016 (Nyamnjoh 2016). To all appearances, ten days of 
protests allowed South African students to win their battle over the hike in tuition fees. 
How and why did they win? In looking at the political trajectory of the 2015 student 
mobilizations and of their relative success, I consider and explore below the peculiari-
ties of higher education in post-apartheid South Africa. 
The article comprises six sections in addition to this introduction. In ‘Student mobili-
zations in young democratic contexts’ (section 2), I present a short literature review of 
the relevant sociological works upon which I have based the analysis of the South Afri-
 
1
 The apartheid regime heavily shaped South African higher education by creating a university system 
based on race divisions. The regime established three types of university. There was a majority of (poor 
and under-funded) universities only accessible to black people (historically black universities, such as the 
University of Fort Hare); a few richly funded only for white people (‘historically white universities’, HWU, 
such as the University of Cape Town or WITS); and one each for coloured people (the University of the 
Western Cape) and for Indian people (the University of Durban-Westville). Although after the end of 
apartheid the ANC government sought actively to overcome these divisions, South African higher educa-
tion is still economically and racially differentiated despite a series of mergers in the early 2000s. All the 
actors I interviewed confirmed this situation. According to Prof. Noor (WITS), today there are still ‘three 
tiers of universities: 1) top tier, Afrikaans and English-speaking universities [HWU]; 2) the bush universities 
[HBU] established by the apartheid regime; 3) middle-level universities.’ 
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can student mobilizations. In ‘Research questions and methodology’, I reformulate the 
research questions of my study and give a short overview of the methods. The section 
on ‘The higher education sector in the broader political and economic context of post-
apartheid South Africa’ provides a historical overview of post-apartheid South Africa by 
connecting HE with the broader political and economic context of the country to show 
how specific persistent features of this context represented one of the sources of stu-
dent discontent in 2015. In ‘The nationalization of the WITS mobilization in 2015’, I re-
spond to the first research question of the article by accounting for the political trajec-
tory of the 2015 student mobilizations. ‘Winning the zero-tuition fee increase for 2016’ 
responds to the second question by making sense of the outcomes. Finally, in ‘Conclud-
ing remarks’, I summarize the main findings of this study by showing the empirical and 
theoretical gaps I have filled. 
 
 
2. Student mobilizations in young democratic contexts 
 
An increasing number of scholars contend that mobilizations occurring in relatively 
new democratic regimes cannot be explained and assessed with the theories elaborat-
ed for the mobilizations in the established democracies of the global North (Cini et al. 
2017; Fadaee 2016; Ness 2016; Paret et al. 2018; von Holdt and Naidoo 2019). In other 
words, the type of socio-political context in which the protest takes place is crucial to 
the understanding and assessment of the protest’s effectiveness (Bosi et al. 2016). In 
short, not all contexts matter in the same way. Kapstein and Converse (2008, 4) have, 
for instance, demonstrated that ‘young democracies are likely to be characterized by 
institutional weaknesses, including ineffectual political parties and an absence of effec-
tive checks and balances on the chief executive’. Considering such weaknesses, orga-
nized or more vocal groups at the social level may somehow play a supplementary po-
litical role. 
These findings seem to especially hold for cases involving students as an organized 
actor. In this respect, Altbach (1992) argues that a student protest occurring in a ‘young 
democracy’ is likely to have a greater political impact than a protest in a relatively con-
solidated democracy. While in established democracies ‘students do not see them-
selves nor are they seen by society as being legitimate political actors […]’, in new de-
mocracies students have often played an important part in liberation movements. 
‘Thus, historically, the student movement has established a degree of political legitima-
cy that allows it to ‘speak truth to power’ with considerable authority’ (Altbach 1992, 
142). Therefore, in contrast to consolidated democracies, where student activism is 
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seen by most people to be an illegitimate intrusion into politics, students in young de-
mocracies are expected to participate directly in politics and activism is regarded as a 
legitimate part of the political system. 
As a result, students in young democracies are often seen as spokespersons for a 
broader population. In a sense, they have authority beyond their relatively small num-
bers and those in power often take student demonstrations and grievances seriously 
for this reason. In many cases, seemingly small student agitations have been effective 
in quickly mobilizing larger social movements or have had a surprising impact on the 
authorities. As it has been noted, students mobilizing in young democracies act as the 
‘conscience’ of their societies (see again Altbach 1992).  
In such contexts, students are thus considered a key societal actor and/or constitu-
ency, whose capacity to be politically effective seems relatively significant (Luescher 
2015). A low consideration of their concerns may bring about a decline in the regime’s 
legitimacy and/or in the government’s credibility (Altbach 1992). Widespread student 
dissatisfaction may soon grow into a serious political issue, and this may induce the 
government to offer a prompt and positive response to the protesters’ demands.  
In South Africa, students played an important role in the liberation movement and 
have thus become an important constituency for the post-apartheid government 
(Nyamnjoh 2016), led by Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) since 1994. More 
notably, the ANC leadership has always perceived black students as ‘children’ of its 
revolution, in terms of both political and generational linkages (Booysen 2016). The 
massive and disruptive mobilizations of 2015 may have produced a breach in this link-
age and in its narrative, so much so that it impelled the government to directly inter-
vene in favour of the students to prevent a decline in public support (see also Cini 
forthcoming). 
What is more, the type of policy field in which students mobilize also affects their 
capacity to be politically effective. Altbach and Klemenčič (2014) argue that student 
protests are expected to achieve greater success when dealing with educational issues 
(such as student funding, academic curricula, university governance) rather than na-
tional political issues. Even though students may be politically powerful when attend-
ing to educational matters in the educational arena, they become weaker when they 
take on broader political issues in the general arena, as they cannot rely upon powerful 
and reliable allies. Societal politics—Altbach and Klemenčič clarify—is generally about 
political power vested in economic and military resources, about the ability to build al-
liances and forge compromises. While energetic and driven, if students enter the politi-
cal arena they may become only a marginal voice—since they seldom possess the sub-
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stantial and procedural knowledge, experience, and networks required for the larger 
political stage.  
The (partial) success of the 2015 student protests in South Africa seems to be well 
explained by such an interpretation. Students were relatively successful when opposing 
the hike in tuition fees for 2016, but then failed to scale up to the national arena with a 
unitary voice to pursue greater goals (i.e. a radical program of redistributive policies) 
due to the presence of stronger actors, namely, national political parties (especially the 
ANC), which hijacked the pursuit of such goals (Booysen 2016). More notably, the re-
turn of the influence of party politics over the student movement after the peak of pro-
tests (October 2015) played a big role in the movement’s ideological factionalism, 
which prevented the students from persevering with a unitary mobilization and from 
building a nationwide subject in the broader political arena (see von Holdt and Naidoo 
2019 for a similar argument). 
 
 
3. Research questions and methodology  
 
Why did a student protest in reaction to a hike in tuition fees at WITS spur a national 
wave of mobilizations in 2015? How did these students successfully oppose such a 
hike? The methodology that I adopted to identify the causal mechanism underlying the 
political trajectory and success of the South African students’ protest campaign of 2015 
is ‘process tracing’ (Bennett and George 2001; Bennet 2004). Process tracing is a re-
search procedure ‘designed to identify processes linking a set of initial conditions to a 
particular outcome’ (Vennesson 2008, 224); or seeking the ‘processes connecting 
movement actions to observed outcomes’ (Bosi et al. 2016, 24).  
Following this approach, I sought to identify those processes which, related to traits 
of the protest and to South African higher education policy, connect the former (i.e. 
protests, ‘movement actions’) to the latter (i.e. ‘observed outcomes’). More specifical-
ly, I identified, on the one hand, the factors and processes which led to the ‘nationali-
zation’ of the WITS protest; and, on the other, the conditions and dynamics of the mo-
bilization which favoured the movement impact (‘zero fee increase for 2016’). In doing 
so, and unlike some recent work in social movement research (see, for instance, Stefa-
novski 2016), I employed a non-positivist approach. Rather than establishing an objec-
tive causal relation between independent and dependent variables narrowly defined, I 
pinpointed those processes linking various conditions to the observed outcomes (‘the 
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nationalization of the protest’, the ‘zero tuition fees’), based on the perceptions of the 
actors involved2.   
As for data collection, I triangulated by combining two qualitative methods, in-depth 
interviews and document analysis. I carried out 30 in-depth interviews (Blee and Taylor 
2002) with various actors involved in the issues at stake, namely, student leaders and 
activists, policy experts, and university leaders (13 of them are explicitly quoted in the 
article). More specifically, in interviewing the student activists and leaders, I was inter-
ested in knowing the political and cultural context affecting the mobilizations as well as 
the students’ goals and strategies. In interviewing the policy experts, I was interested in 
retracing the origin, history, and peculiarities of higher education in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Finally, in interviewing the university leaders, I was interested in collect-
ing information about their reaction to the student mobilizations of which they were 
the target. As for the documentary evidence, I analysed the main documents produced 
by the student activists during the period of protest and the policy documents and sec-
ondary literature on post-apartheid higher education in South Africa. 
 
 
4. The higher education sector in the broader political and economic context 
of post-apartheid South Africa 
 
South Africa represents a ‘young’ democracy (Haynes 2001; Kapstein and Converse 
2008). After a long period of social and political struggles, the apartheid regime was 
brought down by the strength of unions and by the movements on the ground, in con-
junction with the ANC led by Nelson Mandela. The political elections of 1994 marked 
officially the end of apartheid. The ANC achieved a massive success: it obtained over 
60% of the vote in an election which boasted a remarkable turnout of 86% (Johnson 
and Schlemmer 1996). In preparation for the 1994 elections, the ANC formed a political 
coalition, the so-called Tripartite Alliance (TA), with the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The TA has governed 
South Africa from 1994 to the present day. Despite its rhetorical commitment to social 
 
2
 Aware of the limitations of such a ‘constructivist’ approach to process tracing, I do not claim to have 
identified the full and exhaustive set of conditions and processes explaining the observed outcomes. In this 
respect, a full-fledged process tracing methodology would require engaging with the problem of equifinali-
ty. My ‘interpretative’ approach, based on actors’ perceptions, does not allow me to fully tackle such a 
problem. Spotting the correct causal mechanism is particularly needed for the second research question, 
looking at the causes of the observed outcome. To partially solve this issue, I examine contrasting cases in 
the final part of the empirical section devoted to this question. 
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justice and redistribution, the TA (and especially the ANC faction) has ‘aimed at achiev-
ing sustainable long-term economic growth, based on fiscal and monetary discipline as 
well as the reduction of government debt’ (Maree 1998, 49). Closely advised by the 
IMF, the ANC thus embraced the neoliberal prescriptions of wage restraint for workers, 
easing of labour regulations, strict fiscal targets, and widespread privatization of state 
assets3.   
In other words, the post-apartheid democracy was founded on the implicit compro-
mise between political inclusion and economic moderation: the acceptance of the for-
mer was carried out by paying the cost of the latter (von Holdt and Naidoo 2019). The 
white economic ‘elites gained constitutional protection of the status quo distribution 
of wealth in return for accepting electoral and other forms of democratic competition 
as the terrain on which they would henceforth pursue their interests’ (Wood 2000, 6). 
This approach to the economy and to politics worsened the living conditions of the 
South African population, especially those of the poorest social groups, such as the 
workers, unemployed, public employees, and students. More specifically, these policies 
caused a general increase in levels of unemployment, the stagnation of real wages, and 
the rise of socio-economic inequality (Alexander 2013; von Holdt 2014). What is more, 
the ANC government privatised important industries, including the Kumba Iron Ore 
mine, one of South Africa’s most profitable businesses, now owned by Anglo American, 
the multinational mining company with headquarters in Johannesburg and London.  
The policy intervention in the sector of higher education has been characterized by 
the same political trajectory. The ANC’s new ruling elite expected higher education 
(and the related graduate population) to become the key economic engine of a new 
South African society based on knowledge production (Johnson and Schlemmer 1996). 
Furthermore, the initial design of the ANC government was to democratize higher edu-
cation by making it more universally accessible, especially for the black population4.  In 
the terminology of the post-apartheid government, this approach was defined as a phi-
losophy of cooperative governance, ensuring the extension of student representation 
 
3
 This capitulation was partially contested within the ANC itself. As von Holdt and Naidoo (2019, 172) have 
recently noted: ‘In spite of fierce contestation from within the party and the broader alliance, in 1996, the 
ANC government adopted a neoliberal macro-economic policy framework that would constrain the possi-
bility for change.’ 
4
 While initially the ANC made a commitment to free education (based on the 1955 Freedom Charter 
statement and on more recent policy proposals in the 1990s), once in office it chose to water down this 
promise by adopting a neoliberal macro-economic policy and by fulfilling various fiscal constraints. This 
being said, higher education in South Africa has never been free. I thank one the anonymous reviewers 
who helped me clarify this point. 
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across all institutions in university governing bodies and in their committee structures, 
as well as at systemic level, in the higher education bodies5  (Klemenčič et al. 2016). 
However, under the fiscal constraints of the reduction of public debt, the South Afri-
can government rapidly readdressed its higher education policy by opening the way to 
the privatization of higher education costs. The reduction of public funding, along with 
the increase in student loans and tuition fees, were the main political measures that 
the ANC designed and implemented in the second half of the 2000s to handle the im-
minent crisis of neoliberal capitalism and its political repercussions on the field of high-
er education. As a result, a significant share of black students could no longer afford 
the costs of higher education and of university life.  
For several South African policy observers (Booysen 2016; Cloete et al. 2015; 
Nyamnjoh 2016), this situation was simply the result of the contradictory and, to a cer-
tain extent, paradoxical policy orientation that the ANC government led by Mandela 
had adopted in the matter of higher education since 1994. Although the ANC aimed to 
promote student expansion and participation (White Paper 1997), it provided insuffi-
cient funding to pursue this goal. Cele et al. (2016) called it the ‘paradox of post-
apartheid higher education’ in South Africa. The ANC government pursued simultane-
ously two very contradictory goals:  
 
(1) a massive expansion of higher education for black students, which in effect meant 
creating opportunities of access to higher education for historically disadvantaged stu-
dents who came mostly from working class and poor backgrounds; and (2) a self-
imposed commitment to fiscal austerity reflected in the rejection of free education, the 
continuation of cost-sharing, and only limited provision of financial aid, which required 
that students, including the working class and poor, were expected to pay a significant 
share of the costs of study’ (Cele et al. 2016, 182).  
 
Significantly, in terms of gross enrolment rates (GER), the expansion of South African 
higher education reached the level of mass education systems (between 15% and 50% 
in the typology developed by Trow 2006) in the early 2000s, when 18% of the 18-24 
age cohort was enrolled (Klemenčič et al. 2016). Yet ‘state funding for higher education 
 
5
 The South African Higher Education Act of 1997 prescribed the establishment of a student representation 
in every public higher education institution (the ‘student representative council’, SRC), as well as a student 
representation in major decision-making structures at that level. Student participation in university gov-
erning bodies is statutorily granted in legislation. Co-decision, whereby student representatives have full 
voting rights on all or some issues in governing bodies, is also widespread (Luescher and Klemencic 2016; 
Klemencic et al. 2016). 
Lorenzo Cini, The 2015 students mobilization in South Africa  
 
51 
 
as a component of total university income decreased from 49 percent in 2000 to 40 
percent in 2012. […] During this time, the contribution of student fees to total universi-
ty income increased from 24 percent to 31 percent’ (Hodes 2016, 140). As a result, the 
paradox was most severely experienced by poor students whose constrained ability to 
pay a portion of their cost of study could not be mitigated by institutional resources or 
funds from family and relatives. This situation generated tensions and discontent with-
in South African universities (mostly in the HBUs), often transformed into sites of stu-
dent protest and contestation.  
Although not agreeing on all the reasons accompanying such a paradox, most of the 
South African higher education experts tended to see the conjunction of two factors 
underlying the above contradictory position. First, the action of the post-apartheid 
government was driven by a relatively conciliatory attitude towards the previous re-
gime and its power structures (Booysen 2016). Rather than truly questioning the previ-
ous system of higher education, the ANC government preferred to encourage a policy 
of inclusion of the black population in the existing HE institutions (Nyamnjoh 2016). 
Professor Gillespie, Head of the Anthropology Department at WITS, was very clear on 
this point when she confided to me that Mandela’s main strategy when he took office 
was ‘to include black people in the existing institutions of the country without changing 
them. In the economy and higher education. The assimilation of black people into for-
mally white institutions. Everywhere.’ In the same vein, Suren Pillay, Professor of Soci-
ology at the University of Western Cape (UWC), highlighted that ‘the ANC largely left 
intact the universities and their power structures in two respects: a) the institutional 
forms of the universities; b) the issues of financing and funding (the poor universities 
remained poor…)’. 
Secondly, according to most of the South African policy experts I interviewed there 
was also an international reason that played a role in this policy orientation, namely, 
the need for the new-born democracy to be recognized by the global superpowers, es-
pecially the United States, as a reliable political and economic actor. Young democra-
cies necessitate wide international recognition to cement their political legitimacy and 
improve their economic performance (Kapstein and Converse 2008). In other words, 
they aim at stabilizing their internal institutional structures by also seeking internation-
al support. In this sense, the higher education policy could not constitute an exception, 
but had to follow the broader political-economic framework of the new global order, 
namely, neoliberalism. The ANC embraced this framework ever since 1994 (Klemenčič 
et al. 2016). As Prof. Noor noted in his interview: 
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“It is worthwhile to remember ANC implemented its policy of higher education the 
same time when it started embracing neoliberalism in economy and public policies […]. 
So, what happened was that students became seen less as young people educated for 
critical thought but seen as clients. […] My main criticism of ‘transformation’ [the ANC’s 
policy of higher education] is that it was carried out within the neoliberal framework, 
seeing students as clients and workers exploited by outsourcing. Plus, the government 
reduced the investment in higher education, always following this neoliberal principle”. 
 
The framework above heavily informed the guiding principles of the policy docu-
ments on higher education adopted by the ANC government. Among these principles 
was the belief that higher education should be the main policy area to promote social 
mobility and economic growth in post-apartheid South Africa (Cele et al. 2016). Such a 
principle appeared to be central in the goals of the main policy document released by 
the ANC government, entitled ‘Framework for Transformation’ (1996), which explicitly 
conceived of higher education as the privileged means to promote upward mobility 
and economic development. As one reads in the White Paper on Higher Education, 
which laid the foundation of the ‘transformation project’ (1997, 3): ‘Higher education 
equips individuals to make the best use of their talents and of the opportunities of-
fered by society for self-fulfilment.’ As for the goal of economic development, ‘higher 
education must provide education and training to develop the skills and innovations 
necessary for national development and successful participation in the global econo-
my’ (1997, 6).  
By and large, higher education was a key policy field for the ANC government, which 
in turn considered students as a central stakeholder (Klemenčič et al. 2016). Additional-
ly, university students, especially the black component, represented a significant con-
stituency for the ANC (Luescher 2016). They were indeed believed to incarnate the 
‘children of the ANC’s own revolution’ (Booysen 2016, 42), namely, the first generation 
of black students massively and freely accessing South African universities regardless of 
the previous racial divisions. As Prof. Gillespie effectively pointed out, ‘these young 
people are precisely the ANC successful stories’. 
Education was central also in the life of most of the South African people. Klemenčič 
et al. (2016) argue that the idea of higher education as a vector of economic advance-
ment and of social status was relatively widespread among the black South Africans. 
For most of them, to get a university degree was considered the best way to escape 
misery and become part of the country’s elite. In short, higher education had a very 
powerful material and symbolic value for most South Africans (Nyamnjoh 2016). All the 
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policy experts I interviewed confirmed this interpretation. For instance, Prof. Gillespie 
claimed, 
 
Blacks considered higher education an important vector for social mobility. It is con-
sidered very important. And objectively people who attend universities are more likely 
to be employed, to get a job. And remember! To get a job is not only for that individual, 
but for his/her entire family. And this is what makes it so critical. This is a crucial point 
of the South African context. A member of a household of a black township, who gets to 
university and then gets a job, does not only provide an income to himself but to all his 
family. 
 
Similarly, Prof. Noor remarked on this point, 
 
[…] most of the young black students leave the townships to attend the suburban 
schools. This is why their parents believe in the importance of education. The further 
level of education you attend, the more it becomes important. Sometimes the commu-
nity from which the kid comes provides a financial support to the family of the kid to 
bear the costs of higher education. Because higher education is considered the main 
way to get a good job. Therefore, the way in which education is seen is not about 
knowledge but economic advancement.  
 
In other words, higher education and its students have been considered central 
throughout the post-apartheid period, for both the new ruling elite and the broader 
South African society. 
 
 
5. The nationalization of the WITS mobilization in 20156 
 
As noted above, this article aims to provide an answer to the question of why a 2015 
student protest to a hike in tuition fees at WITS university ultimately spurred a national 
wave of mobilizations. Student protests have been numerous in post-apartheid South 
Africa, especially in the HBUs, where the main problems experienced by the black stu-
dent population were loans and fees, accommodation, and food costs. Rarely did these 
protests reach the South African public and gain media attention, however (Luescher 
 
6
 To simplify the presentation of the main findings of this study, I have divided both empirical sections of 
the article (this section and the next one) into subsections. Each subsection features a specific aspect of 
the processes under investigation that I aim to trace. 
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2016). Although facing an apparently common case of fees hike, there were several 
reasons, both structural and conjunctural, which made this issue so explosive in the au-
tumn of 2015 and contributed to triggering the nationalization of the protest. As re-
gards the structural reasons, one ought to consider the specific position of WITS within 
the hierarchy of universities in South Africa as well as the peculiar composition of its 
student body. As for the contingent reason, the protest at WITS in October 2015 was 
not the first and the only student mobilization of the year. To a certain extent, the 
#FeesMustFall mobilisation represented the ‘natural’ continuation of a prior wave of 
protests, triggered in March 2015 at the University of Cape Town and known under the 
banner of #RhodesMustFall. As illustrated in the remainder of the article, such struc-
tural and conjunctural features helped explain the process of ‘nationalization’ of the 
#FeesMustFall mobilization and its successful impact. 
 
The specificities of WITS   
 
As mentioned previously, the apartheid regime heavily shaped South African higher 
education by creating a socially and racially stratified university system. Specifically, 
three types of university, differentiated along racial lines, were created. The most 
powerful universities in terms of political and institutional linkages and the richest ones 
in terms of funding were those few enrolling the white population, the so-called histor-
ical white universities (HWUs). WITS was part of this group, in which the offspring of 
the white elite were educated to become the future ruling class of the country. With 
some changes, such divisions have persisted throughout the post-apartheid era. In this 
respect, the University of the Witwatersrand still retains a dominant position in the 
current hierarchy of South African universities, in terms of both public/political connec-
tions and economic/financial resources. What is more, WITS students constitute and 
are still deemed to constitute the incipient elite of the country. The main difference in 
the apartheid era is that blacks have gradually become the majority of the student 
population (Booysen 2016).  
As highlighted by the international literature (Altbach 1992), the political and eco-
nomic centrality of a university and of its students within the sector of HE and, more 
broadly, across society explains why and how episodes of mobilization, which emerge 
in such institutions, gain a great deal of attention and concern. According to the HE pol-
icy experts I interviewed, student mobilizations at WITS (also at UCT) drew a lot of me-
dia coverage and political interest for two specific reasons. First, as a significant share 
of WITS students come from urban and middle-class backgrounds, they enjoyed privi-
leged access to media and to powerful and/or knowledgeable people through their so-
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cial and political networks. Second, and strictly related to this, such mobilizations were 
perceived as a kind of rebellion of the country’s future elite, whose discontent needed 
to be taken into serious consideration7.  In other words, these particular features of 
WITS in the system of South African universities played a relevant role in the high me-
dia coverage that the #FeesMustFall mobilization gained when it erupted in October 
2015 and eventually made its nationalization possible.  
However, this was not the full story. If, in 2015, South African students massively 
rose up against the government, this occurred also due to the exacerbation of other 
long-lasting problems. In that year, various cultural problems related to higher educa-
tion that the ANC had failed to tackle in the previous two decades became unbearable. 
Besides the worsening of social and economic inequalities (see, for instance, the deep-
ening of economic inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient since the end of 
apartheid), the main obstacle to a truly transformed higher education remained the in-
stitutional immutability of South African universities, especially of the HWUs, embed-
ded in the pre-existing colonial and Eurocentric institutional cultures. In short, South 
African universities exemplified the failure of transformation and the legacy of institu-
tional racism (Hodes 2016).  
 
The #RhodesMustFall: from UCT to WITS   
 
This came forcefully to light in March 2015, when the colonialist character of South 
African higher education became the target of a student mobilization at the University 
of Cape Town (UCT). The mobilization, called to bring down the statue of Cecil Rhodes, 
the British settler epitomizing the institutional racism still present in higher education, 
pointed at ‘decolonizing the colonial structure, the curriculum and everything it st[ood] 
for’ (Nyamnjoh 2016, 146). Over the duration of the protest, the dominance of the ANC 
youth structures was questioned, ‘as many students turned to Black Consciousness, 
 
7
 To confirm this, even though mainly based on their perceptions and networks, all the interviewees point-
ed out how the role of black students with a middle-class background was central in the 2015 mobiliza-
tions taking place in the various HWUs. This feature made such mobilizations worthy of attention. By con-
trast, this was not the case when protests occurred in the HBUs or, even worse, in the townships. The rea-
sons for such media silence are effectively expressed by Prof. Gillespie: ‘for years and years protests have 
been in the townships. And the media never covered these protests. There is a sort of an implicit deal in 
the South African broadcast corporations. The argument is that if you show violence in the townships you 
multiply this violence in the townships. Still now these protests are there. You only come to know them in 
the transport reports (where you find that roads are blocked). There are so different public spheres in this 
country. A result of the apartheid.’   
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Pan-Africanism, and Black thought more generally in their grappling with the problems 
identified with the ANC’ (von Holdt and Naidoo 2019, 1788).  
In this sense, the protest at UCT, also known as #RhodesMustFall (#RMF), represent-
ed the first episode of contestation of Mandela’s political legacy, blamed for having 
failed to truly clear away the colonial structures of South African universities, where an 
increasing number of black students (on average between 70% and 80% in the HWUs, 
see Cele et al. 2016) were now forced to experience a ‘white’ institution with its own 
norms, rules, and practices. The ‘university itself remained a very white, middle-class, 
Eurocentric institution, even as the demographics of the student body changed quite 
dramatically’ (Everatt 2016, 133).  
All the black students I interviewed confided to me to have experienced a feeling of 
alienation when they first entered the academic and social life of the HWUs. For in-
stance, Thabang, a student activist of #RMF at UCT, told me: ‘When I came first to this 
institution, I could not find myself. White culture permeated all the aspects of the life 
at UCT. The feeling in the classroom was horrible. Sitting in a group with white people 
and I say something. Then the white person says the same thing and the professor 
says: hey good idea!’ Similarly, Camalita, a student activist at Rhodes University in 
2015, confessed: ‘I felt uncomfortable joining white universities. It was my first time to 
be in a place with mostly white people. As in a foreign cultural place.’ She continued: 
 
“Before I only went to black schools. I felt also the issue of class. I come from a work-
ing-class family. So, I was not familiar to be with white middle-class students. The kind 
of speaking that white students adopt during lectures is very distant from my cultural 
background. The way you speak to someone older than you is very respectful. You do 
not call professors by the first name. And you do not present your views in a sharp way 
like white students do. They question all the time the knowledge of professors. Especial-
ly white male students”. 
 
Brian, one of the student leaders of the #RMF movement at UCT, expressed this feel-
ing even more clearly: ‘I felt a bit of alienation from the institution and students, as 
80% at Engineering are whites. Competition is very hard. I even stopped attending clas-
ses because I felt uncomfortable there, since it is a place designed for somebody else’. 
 
8
 Not only students affiliated to black consciousness, but also to black radical feminism and queer move-
ments. As noted again by von Holdt and Naidoo (2019, 178), ‘students identifying as feminist and queer 
critiqued student organizations for reproducing masculinist, sexist, misogynistic, racist, homophobic, and 
other exclusionary and prejudicial forms of engagement and organization.’ 
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However, in 2015, in Prof. Pillay’s interpretation, many black ‘students became to 
feel that they were not alone in experiencing the racism of these institutions. As their 
number grew, they started to feel the possibility of a collective resistance to these in-
stitutional forms and cultures of the elitist universities.’ Personally confirming this pro-
cess, Thabang highlighted that ‘it was great when we [black students] realized that the 
individual problems we were experiencing were shared from all. Then we started to re-
alize that the things could be modified together’. In this sense, it was not a coinci-
dence—for Prof. Gillespie—that these protests first took place ‘at UCT because it was 
the whitest institution in the whitest city’. The protesters ‘destroyed the notion of rec-
onciliation and those of non-racialism and negotiated settlement […]. So, the idea of 
decolonisation was precisely a critique to all these existing assets.’  
Confirming this view, Brian remarked effectively the limits of the ANC’s transfor-
mation programme: 
 
“Transformation did not defeat the apartheid. The HE system here is still the result of 
the legacy of our colonization. The government has only a technocratic approach to HE 
that is to produce and educate highly skilled blacks as engineers, lawyers, and so on to 
create a political black elite, depoliticized. Colonialism produced apartheid not the other 
way around. That is why we have university institutions which are embedded in colo-
nized cultural practices and norms. So, we cannot only return to the African project be-
fore the apartheid, because it was the result of colonization”. 
 
Expressing a more nuanced critical view on the process of transformation, Natasha, 
a black student activist at WITS University in 2015, distinguished between a quantita-
tive (‘expansion of black student enrolments in the higher education sector’) and a 
qualitative (‘renewing the practices and institutions of higher education’) character of 
the process by providing the example of her own personal story. In her words: 
 
“The reality is that I would have not been able to have a PhD 20 years ago. Like me, 
many others. Of course, transformation in this sense has worked. One important thing 
of 2015 was the critique of this conception of transformation. It is not only about to 
have a black chancellor, but also what we learn and how we learn. So, it was also an 
issue of transformation of the white institutional culture of historically white universi-
ties. Transforming also the way we teach”. 
 
This new generation of black students, the first cohort which did not experience the 
apartheid regime (known as the ‘born-free generation’), seemed to have lost trust in 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 12(1) 2019: 43-70,  DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v12i1p43 
  
58 
 
the ANC leadership, seen as no longer on track to fulfil the liberation promises 
(Nyamnjoh 2016)9.   
Most of the black student activists I interviewed confirmed this narrative. For in-
stance, Ntsika, a student leader of the 2015 protests at the Cape Peninsula University 
of Technology in Bellville (CPUT Bellville), was very clear in depicting a negative ‘politi-
cal turn’ in the ANC government’s higher education policy over the course of the last 
twenty years. For him, the government shifted from a conception based upon a system 
designed to deliver ‘free higher education for all’ to another one in which even the 
poorest students (and their families) were not granted financial support. In retracing 
the origin and the history of the ‘Transformation agenda’ designed by the ANC leader-
ship, he highlighted in fact: ‘in ‘94 there was in the programme free qualitative educa-
tion. But then they have forgotten over the course of these years. They did not imple-
ment it. The poor remained poor. So, the transformation agenda did not work well or 
at all. Not all the poor students have been able to access to the financial grants. The 
procedure to get it is even very complicated and bureaucratic.’ 
For some policy observers, ‘emancipation was not accompanied by rupture: business 
as usual appeared to be the order of the day’ (Everatt 2016, 133). In short, this genera-
tion ‘signalled its loss of patience, along with demands for immediate action’ (Booysen 
2016, 35). Leigh, a student activist at WITS during the 2015 mobilization, expressed 
very clearly this feeling in depicting the protesters as willing to destroy the ‘Mandela 
myth of the rainbow nation, the idea of a very placid, liberal view of non-racialism […]!’  
 
 
9
 As most of the interviewees (both student activists and policy experts) highlighted, an event that played a 
big role in this feeling of disillusion towards the ANC government was identified in the ‘Marikana massa-
cre’ in 2012. On that occasion, a strike by miners demanding better working conditions was violently re-
pressed by the police forces, causing 34 deaths among the workers. Alexander (2013) depicted it as a turn-
ing point for the post-apartheid regime, an event which set in motion ‘sequences of occurrences that re-
sult in transformation’ (606) in several respects: party politics, trade unions, and movement politics. Vari-
ous pillars of the post-apartheid regime emerged weakened out of this event. More notably, the ‘Marikana 
strikes inaugurated a series of ruptures in the movement landscape, throwing into question key industrial 
relations institutions, reducing the NUM, and weakening COSATU and the Congress constellation, produc-
ing a new labour federation and providing momentum for a small but robust left-wing political challenge 
to ANC domination in the form of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)’ (von Holdt and Naidoo 2019, 177). 
In short, Marikana established ‘the ANC’s separation from much of its voting base’ (Alexander 2013, 616). 
All the student activists I interviewed confirmed this interpretation. For Brian, for instance, ‘Marikana rep-
resented a sort of break of the illusion of the South African dream. From there people started to look for 
alternatives. Also, on campuses students started to organize in several critical groups, from pan-Africanists 
to black radical feminists, relatively independent from the extant political structures.’ 
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“But rainbow—she continued—is an illusion. The students in 2015 made precisely 
this; to show the illusion of that myth. Students brought the issue of decolonisation pre-
cisely to replace the connected (to rainbow nation) myth of transformation. You have 
still to deal with the issue of colonialism in our social institutions (such as universities) 
beyond the State, which left the institutions untouched”. 
 
The student protests that erupted at UCT in March 2015 spread throughout the oth-
er South African universities in the following months, creating groups of students, 
workers, and critical academics openly questioning aspects of the existing institutions 
and of their policies, ranging from the issues of language and curricula to those of out-
sourcing and tuition fees (Nyamnjoh 2016).  
 
 
The #FeesMustFall: from WITS to the rest of the country 
 
It was in this cultural and political climate, very critical towards the neoliberal and 
racist conception of HE (especially among the circles and groups of student activists 
and militants across the universities), that the Vice-Chancellor of WITS, Adam Habib, in 
implementing a decision taken by the University Council, announced in early October a 
10.5% increase in tuition fees for 2016. The announcement triggered a strong reaction 
from the WITS Student Representative Council (SRC), which decided to shut down the 
university in firm opposition to the tuition fee increase. Although the initial protest was 
led by the WITS Students Representative Council dominated by ANC-aligned for-
mations, it soon expanded beyond its origins. Indeed, it was immediately joined by 
those students, academics, and workers who, both in the previous years and in 2015, 
had been organizing and mobilizing in support of various outsourced workers, in a 
group called Workers Solidarity Committee10.   
 
10
 In 2001, WITS outsourced all support services at the University and retrenched over 600 employees in 
the process. This led to the formation of the WITS Workers Solidarity Committee, a committee which vari-
ous students and academics had been involved in, aimed at campaigning for better treatment of workers 
by university management and outsourcing companies. As Prof. Gillespie noted: ‘It was group of workers 
supported by radical students and academics that was born in 2001 when the outsourcing issue came […] 
to create a progressive students-workers alliance.’ More specifically, by May 2015, Habib, the WITS Vice-
Chancellor, was publicly calling for a campaign involving civil society groups to lobby the State for more 
resources to end outsourcing. Partly in response, and given that outsourcing was continuing, and with the 
rising decolonising discourse emerging from #RhodesMustFall, the October 6 Movement was formed at 
WITS. More importantly, it also included academics and students from the University of Johannesburg (UJ) 
(see Satgar 2016). 
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More specifically, the Workers Solidarity Committee had scheduled to stage a pro-
test in October 6 (for this reason it was called ‘the October 6 Movement’) to oppose 
the unfair dismissal of MJL Electrical workers early in the year, after months of not be-
ing paid. The protest was attended by many students and formed the prelude to the 
protests against the tuition fee increase. It also helped solidify the relationship be-
tween students and workers, an alliance that played a key role throughout the #Fees-
MustFall mobilizations (Satgar 2016). Indeed, several workers supported students in 
their shutdown of the university by placing their bodies on the line and providing re-
sources and numbers. More notably, the group behind the October 6 Movement oper-
ated to make the protests reach further than WITS (and UJ) by reaching out to organi-
sations across universities. Also as a result of this effort, the protest rapidly escalated in 
terms of both scale and disruptiveness.  
Soon after the WITS occupation, all the other universities were in fact shut down and 
occupied in solidarity with WITS students (and workers). The spread of university occu-
pations and protests across the country thus officially gave rise to a national student 
movement whose breadth and radicalism had not been so significant since the era of 
the liberation movement (Cele et al. 2016). Although there were attempts by different 
party-political factions to control the movement, students were initially able to unite 
despite their differences and come together with workers in mass marches on the na-
tional government and in occupations and other forms of action at individual institu-
tions. This massive mobilization produced a final agreement on no fee increases in 
2016 and a commitment at some institutions (in addition to WITS) to work towards the 
end of outsourcing (von Holdt and Naidoo 2019). 
 
 
6. Winning the zero-tuition fee increase for 201611  
 
How and why did South African students gain the zero-increase tuition fee conces-
sion? Facing this wave of mobilizations, the ANC government led by Jacob Zuma inter-
vened directly in the fee matter (which legally was under remit of the university coun-
cils) to halt the protests and thus prevent the involvement of other social actors, such 
as national trade unions and political parties in opposition (Booysen 2016). Describing 
 
11
 In this section, I trace the process explaining how South African students obtained the zero-increase tui-
tion fees for 2016. First, the government’s unprepared reaction to the rise of the October protests is pre-
sented. Then, the key role played by the South African public opinion in supporting such protests is illus-
trated. Finally, all these factors are discussed as being central in explaining the protests’ political success, 
also in contrast to explanations of similar movements to abolish or restrict fees in Europe. 
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these events, Dr. Luescher, the Research Director of the HE Unit at the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC) of Cape Town, confided to me, ‘Zuma panicked. He did not 
expect in such short time a so massive mobilization. […] Under the pressure of these 
protests, he panicked. All the entire university campuses across the countries were 
shut down in those weeks. There were riots and a lot of disruption’. After less than two 
weeks of protests (between the second and third week of October), Zuma was thus 
forced to announce the zero increase of tuition fees for 2016. For Luescher, it was pre-
cisely the high level of ‘disruption’ which constituted ‘the crucial element of student 
success. The government was afraid of it’. In short, the protests of October 2015 
caught the South African government unprepared. 
 
A massive and disruptive mobilization 
 
One of the main protagonists of those weeks, Prof. Adam Habib, confirmed to me 
the interpretation above in his narration of the events by highlighting the crucial role 
played by the massive and disruptive protests (‘the government got shaken up from 
the march in Parliament. I guess this was shocking for them’) in conditioning the out-
come. He provided me with a detailed account of the week in which students gained 
the ‘zero increase’ concession, as he was personally involved: 
 
“On Monday, the HE Minister met the students and proposed an increase of 6% (in-
stead of 10%) of the fees. The students rejected it. The following day, they did the big 
demo in front of the Parliament. The same day in the afternoon I got a call from the 
President [Zuma] asking me what I would have recommended. I told him the zero per-
cent, because students were not going to stop. I believed that at the point it was possi-
ble [..]. I really thought that it was possible. After the march on Parliament and its big 
size, I thought that something was changed. There was a move and the government 
will make this concession. So, the next Friday in the official meeting of all the parts 
(government, students and vice-chancellors) I was expected to speak first on the behalf 
of the vice-chancellors and I said that we supported the zero percent increase”. 
 
Habib admitted that the protests played a crucial role in making him change his mind 
towards the increase of tuition fees, when he confided to me that the student ‘move-
ment forced to change our position’. He then added,  
 
“I still believe that it was the only option available at the time. When the social 
movement emerged, I believed, that the parameters were changed. Some people see 
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this thing as a contradiction. I do not! You respond to power. The first time you respond 
to the constraints of the institutional system, then when social struggles emerge, they 
open the space for new options and possibilities12”.  
 
In his interview, Rashad, a student activist at WITS in 2015, raised a similar point 
when he stressed, ‘a large part of that [the student success] was due to our disruption. 
The fact that the general shutdown would have blocked the graduation of students for 
the next year. […] The pressure from society was so strong that the government was 
forced to do that concession. There were thousands of students besieging Union Build-
ing. The pressure made it’. As effectively put by Ntsika (CPUT) in his report of the ten 
days of protest in 2015: ‘We went to disrupt the airport. So, it could be a total block 
scaring for the government.’  
In the same vein, Vuyo, a political activist and PhD candidate at the University of the 
Western Cape (UWC) in Cape Town at the time of the #FMF mobilizations, explicitly 
stressed the performative character of the ‘chaos’ generated by the student protests as 
a key factor capable of heavily conditioning President Zuma’s political orientation on 
the issue of student fees, scared by the disruptive escalation of the student action. For 
her, ‘the fear of chaos and disruption’ represented one of the main reasons prompting 
the direct intervention of the government. ‘Across countries there was chaos every-
where. All the universities were shut down. So, the government was fearing thinking 
that more it could happen. The fear of these massive protests. Government was going 
to lose the most on financial side, as students were damaging the infrastructure of sev-
eral universities.’ 
 
The support of public opinion  
 
Yet the disruptive and massive character of the protests was only half the story. 
They would not have been so effective if the students had not gained significant public 
support and, at the same time, had not been considered a central element of the 
‘ANC’s successful liberation story’ (Nyamnjoh 2016). During the early period of the pro-
tests (October 2015), students in fact won massive public sympathy and support. ‘The 
combined pressure of protest and public opinion saw government blink and concede’ 
 
12
 In this section, I trace the process explaining how South African students obtained the zero-increase tui-
tion fees for 2016. First, the government’s unprepared reaction to the rise of the October protests is pre-
sented. Then, the key role played by the South African public opinion in supporting such protests is illus-
trated. Finally, all these factors are discussed as being central in explaining the protests’ political success, 
also in contrast to explanations of similar movements to abolish or restrict fees in Europe. 
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(Everatt 2016, 135). All the actors I interviewed confirmed this interpretation. For Prof. 
Pillay (UWC), even the mainstream media (newspapers and TV broadcasts) reported 
the protests ‘in a very sympathetic way. [...] So, the public opinion supported them.’ In 
his view, this support was decisive to persuade the government to announce the ‘zero-
increase’ concession.  
What is more, amassing positive attention from most of the South African people on 
such a contested issue (student fees) was a conscious strategy adopted by the student 
movement to exert greater political pressure on the government. This was the reason 
why the students took massively and disruptively to the streets of most South African 
cities during the 10 days of protests in October 2015. In the words of Ntsika (CPUT), 
‘we brought the protest outside the campuses, so the public could sympathize with us.’ 
The consideration that a supportive public opinion constituted a key political role in 
the pursuit of the ‘zero increase tuition fees’ for 2016 was indeed shared by most of 
the student activists I interviewed. Thabang (UCT) fully recognized it, when he re-
marked to me, ‘we had a lot of sympathy from the public opinion. That is why the Pres-
ident called the student leaders to the Union Building to calm down the situation. That 
is why he proposed the zero increase. […]. The government was in a very weak posi-
tion, so it could but capitulate.’ However, this capitulation would not have been so rap-
id if the ANC government had not considered students, especially the blacks, as ‘its 
children’ and, therefore, as a key component of its constituency.  
 
A South African story  
 
The 2015 student protests were politically harmful for the government, as they re-
vealed the end of the historical linkage between the ANC, along with its foundational 
myth, Nelson Mandela, and a segment of the South African population, the students, 
considered relevant for the country’s future (see also Cini forthcoming). Echoing Alt-
bach’s views (1992) on the political proximity between the (new) ruling elite and uni-
versity students in young democracies, several South African scholars closely observed 
the end of this relationship in 2015. It soon became known that ‘much of the revolt 
originated from the children of the 1994 liberation, many of whom were specifically as-
sociated with the ANC’s student structures. The ANC and its government had to [...] 
halt the political migration of its support base and contain anti-systemic action and the 
erosion of its hegemony’ (Booysen 2016, 24). This situation—Booysen clarified—
helped ‘to get the ANC government to compromise on fee increases and student fund-
ing’ (Booysen 2016, 24). Confirming this interpretation, Prof. Gillespie (WITS) illustrated 
how the combination of these factors (i.e. student mobilization, public opinion support, 
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and the ANC’s high consideration of students) played a key role in explaining the stu-
dents’ success: 
 
“There was a massive mobilization of young people which nobody expected. It was 
also about the support of the public opinion that the students got. These young people 
are precisely the ANC successful stories. This scared to death the ANC, because the ANC 
considered them their successful kids, not like the township people; these young people 
are a key ANC constituency. The ANC got very scared by the extension and orientation 
of the mobilization. It was shocking”.  
 
Facing such a situation, and to prevent a further loss of public support especially 
from a significant (even symbolic) component of its electorate, such as the students, 
the ANC government felt forced to capitulate and offer the ‘zero fee increase’ conces-
sion to the protesters. Throughout the period of mobilization, the students became the 
spokespersons for a broader segment of the population. They succeeded in exhibiting 
authority beyond their small numbers by mobilizing larger societal sectors and there-
fore producing an impact on the government (Cini forthcoming). 
Yet while students were relatively successful in opposing the hike in tuition fees for 
2016, they failed to affect policies in the broader political arena, as the influence of 
party politics (especially of the ANC and the EFF) contributed to the ideological division 
within the student movement and therefore to its end. Significantly, the role of parties 
accelerated the split of the movement along two ideological positions, which reflected 
an existing cleavage. On the one hand, some students were satisfied with the outcome 
of zero-increase fees and argued for the return to classes (namely, the students close 
to the ANC youth organizations); on the other, there were those who aimed at pursu-
ing the goal of free education and a more progressive agenda of public policies nation-
wide (the EFF). This split marked the end of the non-partisan and unitary period of the 
movement, which characterized the peak of protest in October 2015, by opening the 
way to the movement’s radicalization and, in turn, to the institutional and political re-
pression of 2016 (Holdt and Naidoo 2019). In this respect, the South African case con-
firms Altbach and Klemenčič’s (2014) thesis on the variable impact of student move-
ments depending on the policy issue for which they mobilize. Students are relatively 
powerful when mobilizing on educational issues but become weaker when they deal 
with broader political questions, as the influence of party politics heavily affects the 
outcomes. 
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Alternative explanations  
 
My explanation for the impact of the #FMF student movement can be usefully con-
trasted with international cases where other factors produced a similar impact or, on 
the contrary, some absent factors led to failure. The case of Germany, where tuition 
fees have recently been abolished in several federal states, provides an illuminating 
counterpoint to my explanation. In Germany tuition fees were abolished within a 
timeframe of 7 years during the early 2000s in all the 7 federal states in which they had 
been implemented. Unlike the South African case of the #FeesMustFall movement, no 
single episode of student protest played a decisive role in their abolition. Rather, in 
Germany other institutional and political factors mattered the most. 
According to Hutter and Krucken (2014), there were three key factors that brought 
about the observed outcome: ‘First, the strong orientation in Germany towards the 
welfare state which turns the subject of tuition fees into a highly-charged political 
question. Arguments of social justice are decisive in this context. Second, there was the 
issue of uncertainties about the effects of tuition fees, which the media repeatedly fo-
cused on. A third factor is the federal structure of the German higher education sys-
tem. The combination of these factors leads to tuition fees not being viewed as legiti-
mate in Germany’ (Hutter and Krucken 2014, 86). In short, and unlike in South Africa, 
students did not represent the main agent in the German policy shift on tuition fees.  
My explanation is also worth contrasting with the English case, where one key factor 
for the South African success was absent. In England, students massively mobilized 
against the increase of tuition fees in 2010. However, they failed and the hike in tuition 
fees was in fact implemented. English students were not perceived to be a credible po-
litical threat by the British government (Cini 2018). Overall, the German and the English 
cases are compatible with my analysis of the political relevance of student protests in 
young democracies. In the German case, abolition was obtained but without the deci-
sive support of students, whereas in England students played a central role and failed.  
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Unlike the 1968 mobilizations, recent student protests have not attracted significant 
scholarly attention (Brooks 2016). Little attention has been devoted to the investiga-
tion of their political effects (for a valuable exception, see Cini 2018). Very few studies 
explored the effects that these protests brought about in a non-European or non-
American country (see, for instance, Luescher and Klemenčič 2016, von Holdt and Nai-
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doo 2019)13.  The present article aimed to fill these gaps by providing a context-driven 
explanation of the victory that the 2015 student mobilizations (#RMF and #FMF) ob-
tained in opposing a fee increase in South Africa. I looked at these protests as the re-
sult of a long political process, rather than an episodic and isolated protest event. More 
importantly, I showed how the sedimentation and accumulation of changes in the field 
of higher education, as connected to the changes in the political-economic context of 
post-apartheid South Africa, have played a significant role in activating the student 
mobilizations of 2015. It was not by chance that in October of the same year South Af-
rican students occupied and shut down most of the universities across the country. The 
immediate demand of students was to halt tuition fee increases and take up the gov-
ernment on its erstwhile promise to provide free education. After ten days of big pro-
tests, the South African government was forced to partly agree to the student de-
mands by committing to a 0% fee increase for 2016. 
Building on Altbach’s idea of the political centrality of students in ‘young’ democra-
cies, I showed that the 2015 student mobilizations were effective as they undermined 
the mainstream narrative of the post-apartheid liberation and of its ‘most successful 
kids’ (i.e. the students), a narrative which the ANC government had forged to build its 
political popularity. Facing a loss of consensus, the ANC government was forced to 
come to an agreement with the students (‘zero increase tuition fees’ for 2016) to avoid 
a further escalation of the protest and its transformation into a more politically serious 
issue. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
List of the people interviewed and quoted in the article (in alphabetic order)14  
 
Student activists: 
Brian, University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Camalita, Rhodes University (RU) 
Leigh, University of the Witwatersrand of Johannesburg (WITS) 
Natasha, University of the Witwatersrand of Johannesburg (WITS) 
Ntsika, Cape Peninsula University of Technology of Bellville (CPUT) 
 
13
 Truth be told, there has been an increasing number of publications, mostly scholarly, on the 2015-16 
student movement in South Africa in recent years. 
14
 Truth be told, there has been an increasing number of publications, mostly scholarly, on the 2015-16 
student movement in South Africa in recent years. 
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Rashad, University of the Witwatersrand of Johannesburg (WITS) 
Thabang, University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Vuyo, University of the Western Cape (UWC) 
 
Policy experts: 
Prof. Kelly Gillespie, University of the Witwatersrand of Johannesburg (WITS) 
Dr. Thierry Luescher, Human Sciences Research Council of Cape Town (HSRC) 
Prof. Nieftagodien Noor, University of the Witwatersrand of Johannesburg (WITS)  
Prof. Suren Pillay, University of the Western Cape (UWC) 
 
University leaders: 
Vice-Chancellor Prof. Adam Habib, University of the Witwatersrand of Johannesburg 
(WITS) 
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